- Aug 11, 2022
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220809175513.082573955@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by:
Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de> Tested-by:
Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by:
Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk> Tested-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by:
Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by:
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit ba6e31af upstream. RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't completed yet. #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ mov $(nr/2), reg; \ 771: \ call 772f; \ 773: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 773b; \ 772: \ call 774f; \ 775: /* speculation trap */ \ pause; \ lfence; \ jmp 775b; \ 774: \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here. \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based attacks. Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent speculation while RSB is being filled. Suggested-by:
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Sneddon authored
commit 2b129932 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RETPOLINE need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable retpoline explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RETPOLINE and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB Filling at vmexit. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] [ Pawan: Update commit message to replace RSB_VMEXIT with RETPOLINE ] Signed-off-by:
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by:
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Ning Qiang authored
commit fd97e4ad upstream. In do_adb_query() function of drivers/macintosh/adb.c, req->data is copied form userland. The parameter "req->data[2]" is missing check, the array size of adb_handler[] is 16, so adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address and adb_handler[req->data[2]].handler_id will lead to oob read. Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ning Qiang <sohu0106@126.com> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713153734.2248-1-sohu0106@126.com Signed-off-by:
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Werner Sembach authored
commit f0341e67 upstream. Taking a recent change in the i8042 quirklist to this one: Clevo board_names are somewhat unique, and if not: The generic Board_-/Sys_Vendor string "Notebook" doesn't help much anyway. So identifying the devices just by the board_name helps keeping the list significantly shorter and might even hit more devices requiring the fix. Signed-off-by:
Werner Sembach <wse@tuxedocomputers.com> Fixes: c844d22f ("ACPI: video: Force backlight native for Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU") Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Werner Sembach authored
commit c752089f upstream. The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10, Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2: They have a working native and video interface. However the default detection mechanism first registers the video interface before unregistering it again and switching to the native interface during boot. This results in a dangling SBIOS request for backlight change for some reason, causing the backlight to switch to ~2% once per boot on the first power cord connect or disconnect event. Setting the native interface explicitly circumvents this buggy behaviour by avoiding the unregistering process. Signed-off-by:
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Ming Lei authored
commit 673235f9 upstream. When queuing I/O request to LLD, STS_RESOURCE may be returned because: - Host is in recovery or blocked - Target queue throttling or target is blocked - LLD rejection In these scenarios BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE is returned to the block layer to avoid an unnecessary re-run of the queue. However, all of the requests queued to this SCSI device may complete immediately after reading 'sdev->device_busy' and BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE is returned to block layer. In that case the current I/O won't get a chance to get queued since it is invisible at that time for both scsi_run_queue_async() and blk-mq's RESTART. Fix the issue by not returning BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE in this situation. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202100419.525144-1-ming.lei@redhat.com Fixes: 86ff7c2a ("blk-mq: introduce BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE") Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Cc: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com> Cc: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com> Reported-by:
John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Tested-by:
"chenxiang (M)" <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by:
Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wei Mingzhi authored
commit 829eea7c upstream. USB device ID of some versions of XiaoDu WiFi Dongle is 2955:1003 instead of 2955:1001. Both are the same mt7601u hardware. Signed-off-by:
Wei Mingzhi <whistler@member.fsf.org> Acked-by:
Jakub Kicinski <kubakici@wp.pl> Signed-off-by:
Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210618160840.305024-1-whistler@member.fsf.org Cc: Yan Xinyu <sdlyyxy@bupt.edu.cn> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
The gcc build warning prevents all clang-built kernels from working properly, so comment it out to fix the build. This is a -stable kernel only patch for now, it will be resolved differently in mainline releases in the future. Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: "Justin M. Forbes" <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Leo Yan authored
[ Upstream commit 2d86612a ] When using 'perf mem' and 'perf c2c', an issue is observed that tool reports the wrong offset for global data symbols. This is a common issue on both x86 and Arm64 platforms. Let's see an example, for a test program, below is the disassembly for its .bss section which is dumped with objdump: ... Disassembly of section .bss: 0000000000004040 <completed.0>: ... 0000000000004080 <buf1>: ... 00000000000040c0 <buf2>: ... 0000000000004100 <thread>: ... First we used 'perf mem record' to run the test program and then used 'perf --debug verbose=4 mem report' to observe what's the symbol info for 'buf1' and 'buf2' structures. # ./perf mem record -e ldlat-loads,ldlat-stores -- false_sharing.exe 8 # ./perf --debug verbose=4 mem report ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x40c0 sh_addr: 0x4040 sh_offset: 0x3028 symbol__new: buf2 0x30a8-0x30e8 ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x4080 sh_addr: 0x4040 sh_offset: 0x3028 symbol__new: buf1 0x3068-0x30a8 ... The perf tool relies on libelf to parse symbols, in executable and shared object files, 'st_value' holds a virtual address; 'sh_addr' is the address at which section's first byte should reside in memory, and 'sh_offset' is the byte offset from the beginning of the file to the first byte in the section. The perf tool uses below formula to convert a symbol's memory address to a file address: file_address = st_value - sh_addr + sh_offset ^ ` Memory address We can see the final adjusted address ranges for buf1 and buf2 are [0x30a8-0x30e8) and [0x3068-0x30a8) respectively, apparently this is incorrect, in the code, the structure for 'buf1' and 'buf2' specifies compiler attribute with 64-byte alignment. The problem happens for 'sh_offset', libelf returns it as 0x3028 which is not 64-byte aligned, combining with disassembly, it's likely libelf doesn't respect the alignment for .bss section, therefore, it doesn't return the aligned value for 'sh_offset'. Suggested by Fangrui Song, ELF file contains program header which contains PT_LOAD segments, the fields p_vaddr and p_offset in PT_LOAD segments contain the execution info. A better choice for converting memory address to file address is using the formula: file_address = st_value - p_vaddr + p_offset This patch introduces elf_read_program_header() which returns the program header based on the passed 'st_value', then it uses the formula above to calculate the symbol file address; and the debugging log is updated respectively. After applying the change: # ./perf --debug verbose=4 mem report ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x40c0 p_vaddr: 0x3d28 p_offset: 0x2d28 symbol__new: buf2 0x30c0-0x3100 ... dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x4080 p_vaddr: 0x3d28 p_offset: 0x2d28 symbol__new: buf1 0x3080-0x30c0 ... Fixes: f17e04af ("perf report: Fix ELF symbol parsing") Reported-by:
Chang Rui <changruinj@gmail.com> Suggested-by:
Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Acked-by:
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220724060013.171050-2-leo.yan@linaro.org Signed-off-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 99a63d36 ] Domingo Dirutigliano and Nicola Guerrera report kernel panic when sending nf_queue verdict with 1-byte nfta_payload attribute. The IP/IPv6 stack pulls the IP(v6) header from the packet after the input hook. If user truncates the packet below the header size, this skb_pull() will result in a malformed skb (skb->len < 0). Fixes: 7af4cc3f ("[NETFILTER]: Add "nfnetlink_queue" netfilter queue handler over nfnetlink") Reported-by:
Domingo Dirutigliano <pwnzer0tt1@proton.me> Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Reviewed-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Duoming Zhou authored
[ Upstream commit b89fc26f ] There are sleep in atomic context bugs in timer handlers of sctp such as sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event(), sctp_generate_probe_event(), sctp_generate_t1_init_event(), sctp_generate_timeout_event(), sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event() and so on. The root cause is sctp_sched_prio_init_sid() with GFP_KERNEL parameter that may sleep could be called by different timer handlers which is in interrupt context. One of the call paths that could trigger bug is shown below: (interrupt context) sctp_generate_probe_event sctp_do_sm sctp_side_effects sctp_cmd_interpreter sctp_outq_teardown sctp_outq_init sctp_sched_set_sched n->init_sid(..,GFP_KERNEL) sctp_sched_prio_init_sid //may sleep This patch changes gfp_t parameter of init_sid in sctp_sched_set_sched() from GFP_KERNEL to GFP_ATOMIC in order to prevent sleep in atomic context bugs. Fixes: 5bbbbe32 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations") Signed-off-by:
Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn> Acked-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220723015809.11553-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by:
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Maloszewski authored
[ Upstream commit 5fcbb711 ] Fix the inability to bring an interface up on a setup with only MSI interrupts enabled (no MSI-X). Solution is to add a default number of QPs = 1. This is enough, since without MSI-X support driver enables only a basic feature set. Fixes: bc6d33c8 ("i40e: Fix the number of queues available to be mapped for use") Signed-off-by:
Dawid Lukwinski <dawid.lukwinski@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Michal Maloszewski <michal.maloszewski@intel.com> Tested-by:
Dave Switzer <david.switzer@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722175401.112572-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit 79f55473 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 9c21d2fc ("tcp: add tcp_comp_sack_nr sysctl") Signed-off-by:
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit 4866b2b0 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 6d82aa24 ("tcp: add tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns sysctl") Signed-off-by:
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit aa709da0 ] Since commit 1033990a ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path"), SCTP has supported memory accounting on tx path where 'sctp_wmem' is used by sk_wmem_schedule(). So we should fix the description for this option in ip-sysctl.rst accordingly. v1->v2: - Improve the description as Marcelo suggested. Fixes: 1033990a ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path") Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit 2afdbe7b ] While reading sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 032ee423 ("tcp: helpers to mitigate ACK loops by rate-limiting out-of-window dupacks") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit 85225e6f ] While reading sysctl_tcp_autocorking, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: f54b3111 ("tcp: auto corking") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit 1330ffac ] While reading sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: f6722583 ("tcp: track min RTT using windowed min-filter") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit e0bb4ab9 ] While reading sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 95bd09eb ("tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing") Signed-off-by:
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Liang He authored
[ Upstream commit ebbbe23f ] In bcm5421_init(), we should call of_node_put() for the reference returned by of_get_parent() which has increased the refcount. Fixes: 3c326fe9 ("[PATCH] ppc64: Add new PHY to sungem") Signed-off-by:
Liang He <windhl@126.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220720131003.1287426-1-windhl@126.com Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
[ Upstream commit 8ebcc62c ] While reading sysctl_igmp_qrv, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. This test can be packed into a helper, so such changes will be in the follow-up series after net is merged into net-next. qrv ?: READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv); Fixes: a9fe8e29 ("ipv4: implement igmp_qrv sysctl to tune igmp robustness variable") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit e2732600 upstream. When we close ping6 sockets, some resources are left unfreed because pingv6_prot is missing sk->sk_prot->destroy(). As reported by syzbot [0], just three syscalls leak 96 bytes and easily cause OOM. struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr; char data[24] = {0}; int fd; hdr = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)data; hdr->hdrlen = 2; hdr->type = IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_4; fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, NEXTHDR_ICMP); setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, data, 24); close(fd); To fix memory leaks, let's add a destroy function. Note the socket() syscall checks if the GID is within the range of net.ipv4.ping_group_range. The default value is [1, 0] so that no GID meets the condition (1 <= GID <= 0). Thus, the local DoS does not succeed until we change the default value. However, at least Ubuntu/Fedora/RHEL loosen it. $ cat /usr/lib/sysctl.d/50-default.conf ... -net.ipv4.ping_group_range = 0 2147483647 Also, there could be another path reported with these options, and some of them require CAP_NET_RAW. setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM (inet6_sk(sk)->pktoptions) IPV6_RECVPATHMTU (inet6_sk(sk)->rxpmtu) IPV6_HOPOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_RTHDR (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_DSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt) getsockopt IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR (inet6_sk(sk)->ipv6_fl_list) For the record, I left a different splat with syzbot's one. unreferenced object 0xffff888006270c60 (size 96): comm "repro2", pid 231, jiffies 4294696626 (age 13.118s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....D........... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000f6bc7ea9>] sock_kmalloc (net/core/sock.c:2564 net/core/sock.c:2554) [<000000006d699550>] do_ipv6_setsockopt.constprop.0 (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:715) [<00000000c3c3b1f5>] ipv6_setsockopt (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024) [<000000007096a025>] __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2254) [<000000003a8ff47b>] __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2265 net/socket.c:2262 net/socket.c:2262) [<000000007c409dcb>] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [<00000000e939c4a9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [0]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a8430774139ec3ab7176 Fixes: 6d0bfe22 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.") Reported-by:
<syzbot+a8430774139ec3ab7176@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reported-by:
Ayushman Dutta <ayudutta@amazon.com> Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728012220.46918-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit db3815a2 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 282f23c6 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2") Signed-off-by:
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Liang He authored
commit a3435afb upstream. In ufshcd_populate_vreg(), we should hold the reference returned by of_parse_phandle() and then use it to call of_node_put() for refcount balance. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220719071529.1081166-1-windhl@126.com Fixes: aa497613 ("ufs: Add regulator enable support") Reviewed-by:
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit 8499a245 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit 706c6202 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_frto, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit 36eeee75 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit 02ca527a upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_app_win, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Kuniyuki Iwashima authored
commit 58ebb1c8 upstream. While reading sysctl_tcp_dsack, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Harald Freudenberger authored
commit 918e75f7 upstream. This patch slightly reworks the s390 arch_get_random_seed_{int,long} implementation: Make sure the CPACF trng instruction is never called in any interrupt context. This is done by adding an additional condition in_task(). Justification: There are some constrains to satisfy for the invocation of the arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}() functions: - They should provide good random data during kernel initialization. - They should not be called in interrupt context as the TRNG instruction is relatively heavy weight and may for example make some network loads cause to timeout and buck. However, it was not clear what kind of interrupt context is exactly encountered during kernel init or network traffic eventually calling arch_get_random_seed_long(). After some days of investigations it is clear that the s390 start_kernel function is not running in any interrupt context and so the trng is called: Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<00000001064e90ca>] arch_get_random_seed_long.part.0+0x32/0x70 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010715f246>] random_init+0xf6/0x238 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010712545c>] start_kernel+0x4a4/0x628 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010590402a>] startup_continue+0x2a/0x40 The condition in_task() is true and the CPACF trng provides random data during kernel startup. The network traffic however, is more difficult. A typical call stack looks like this: Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5600fc>] extract_entropy.constprop.0+0x23c/0x240 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b560136>] crng_reseed+0x36/0xd8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5604b8>] crng_make_state+0x78/0x340 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5607e0>] _get_random_bytes+0x60/0xf8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b56108a>] get_random_u32+0xda/0x248 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aefe7a8>] kfence_guarded_alloc+0x48/0x4b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aeff35e>] __kfence_alloc+0x18e/0x1b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aef7f10>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x368/0x4d8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611eac>] kmalloc_reserve+0x44/0xa0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611f98>] __alloc_skb+0x90/0x178 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b6120dc>] __napi_alloc_skb+0x5c/0x118 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f06b4>] qeth_extract_skb+0x13c/0x680 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f6526>] qeth_poll+0x256/0x3f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63d76e>] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x46/0x2f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63dbec>] net_rx_action+0x1cc/0x408 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b937302>] __do_softirq+0x132/0x6b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf46ce>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x13e/0x170 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf531a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x22/0x50 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b922506>] do_io_irq+0xe6/0x198 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935826>] io_int_handler+0xd6/0x110 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b9358a6>] psw_idle_exit+0x0/0xa Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: ([<000000008ab9c59a>] arch_cpu_idle+0x52/0xe0) Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b933cfe>] default_idle_call+0x6e/0xd0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac59f4e>] do_idle+0xf6/0x1b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac5a28e>] cpu_startup_entry+0x36/0x40 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abb0d90>] smp_start_secondary+0x148/0x158 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935b9e>] restart_int_handler+0x6e/0x90 which confirms that the call is in softirq context. So in_task() covers exactly the cases where we want to have CPACF trng called: not in nmi, not in hard irq, not in soft irq but in normal task context and during kernel init. Signed-off-by:
Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by:
Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713131721.257907-1-freude@linux.ibm.com Fixes: e4f74400 ("s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier") [agordeev@linux.ibm.com changed desc, added Fixes and Link, removed -stable] Signed-off-by:
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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ChenXiaoSong authored
commit 38c9c22a upstream. Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as follows: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880751acee8 by task a.out/879 CPU: 7 PID: 879 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220630-00001-gcc5218c8bd2c-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x1c0/0x2b0 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x484 print_report.cold+0x55/0x232 kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0 ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130 ntfs_are_names_equal.cold+0x2b/0x41 ntfs_attr_find+0x43b/0xb90 ntfs_attr_lookup+0x16d/0x1e0 ntfs_read_locked_attr_inode+0x4aa/0x2360 ntfs_attr_iget+0x1af/0x220 ntfs_read_locked_inode+0x246c/0x5120 ntfs_iget+0x132/0x180 load_system_files+0x1cc6/0x3480 ntfs_fill_super+0xa66/0x1cf0 mount_bdev+0x38d/0x460 legacy_get_tree+0x10d/0x220 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 do_new_mount+0x2da/0x6d0 path_mount+0x496/0x19d0 __x64_sys_mount+0x284/0x300 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f3f2118d9ea Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc269deac8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3f2118d9ea RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffc269dec00 RBP: 00007ffc269dec80 R08: 00007ffc269deb00 R09: 00007ffc269dec44 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f81ab1d220 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:0000000085430378 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x555c6a81d pfn:0x751ac memcg:ffff888101f7e180 anon flags: 0xfffffc00a0014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc00a0014 ffffea0001bf2988 ffffea0001de2448 ffff88801712e201 raw: 0000000555c6a81d 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff888101f7e180 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880751acd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880751ace00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff8880751ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff8880751acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8880751acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== The reason is that struct ATTR_RECORD->name_offset is 6485, end address of name string is out of bounds. Fix this by adding sanity check on end address of attribute name string. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] [chenxiaosong2@huawei.com: cleanup suggested by Hawkins Jiawei] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220709064511.3304299-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707105329.4020708-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Signed-off-by:
ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Cc: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com> Cc: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Cc: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Luiz Augusto von Dentz authored
commit d0be8347 upstream. This fixes the following trace which is caused by hci_rx_work starting up *after* the final channel reference has been put() during sock_close() but *before* the references to the channel have been destroyed, so instead the code now rely on kref_get_unless_zero/l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed. refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc114f5bf18 by task kworker/u17:14/705 CPU: 4 PID: 705 Comm: kworker/u17:14 Tainted: G S W 4.14.234-00003-g1fb6d0bd49a4-dirty #28 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM sm8150 Flame DVT (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x378 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0x124/0x148 print_address_description+0x80/0x2e8 __kasan_report+0x168/0x188 kasan_report+0x10/0x18 __asan_load4+0x84/0x8c refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 l2cap_chan_put+0x48/0x12c l2cap_recv_frame+0x4770/0x6550 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x44c/0x7a4 hci_acldata_packet+0x100/0x188 hci_rx_work+0x178/0x23c process_one_work+0x35c/0x95c worker_thread+0x4cc/0x960 kthread+0x1a8/0x1c4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Tested-by:
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- Jul 29, 2022
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220727161004.175638564@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by:
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Jeffrey Hugo authored
commit a2bad844 upstream. According to Dexuan, the hypervisor folks beleive that multi-msi allocations are not correct. compose_msi_msg() will allocate multi-msi one by one. However, multi-msi is a block of related MSIs, with alignment requirements. In order for the hypervisor to allocate properly aligned and consecutive entries in the IOMMU Interrupt Remapping Table, there should be a single mapping request that requests all of the multi-msi vectors in one shot. Dexuan suggests detecting the multi-msi case and composing a single request related to the first MSI. Then for the other MSIs in the same block, use the cached information. This appears to be viable, so do it. 4.19 backport - add hv_msi_get_int_vector helper function. Fixed merge conflict due to delivery_mode name change (APIC_DELIVERY_MODE_FIXED is the value given to dest_Fixed). Removed unused variable in hv_compose_msi_msg. Fixed reference to msi_desc->pci to point to the same is_msix variable. Removed changes to compose_msi_req_v3 since it doesn't exist yet. Suggested-by:
Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by:
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282599-21643-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com Signed-off-by:
Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeffrey Hugo authored
commit b4b77778 upstream. Currently if compose_msi_msg() is called multiple times, it will free any previous IRTE allocation, and generate a new allocation. While nothing prevents this from occurring, it is extraneous when Linux could just reuse the existing allocation and avoid a bunch of overhead. However, when future IRTE allocations operate on blocks of MSIs instead of a single line, freeing the allocation will impact all of the lines. This could cause an issue where an allocation of N MSIs occurs, then some of the lines are retargeted, and finally the allocation is freed/reallocated. The freeing of the allocation removes all of the configuration for the entire block, which requires all the lines to be retargeted, which might not happen since some lines might already be unmasked/active. Signed-off-by:
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Jeffrey Hugo authored
commit 455880df upstream. In the multi-MSI case, hv_arch_irq_unmask() will only operate on the first MSI of the N allocated. This is because only the first msi_desc is cached and it is shared by all the MSIs of the multi-MSI block. This means that hv_arch_irq_unmask() gets the correct address, but the wrong data (always 0). This can break MSIs. Lets assume MSI0 is vector 34 on CPU0, and MSI1 is vector 33 on CPU0. hv_arch_irq_unmask() is called on MSI0. It uses a hypercall to configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 34 of CPU0. This is correct. Then hv_arch_irq_unmask is called on MSI1. It uses another hypercall to configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 33 of CPU0. This is wrong, and results in both MSI0 and MSI1 being routed to vector 33. Linux will observe extra instances of MSI1 and no instances of MSI0 despite the endpoint device behaving correctly. For the multi-MSI case, we need unique address and data info for each MSI, but the cached msi_desc does not provide that. However, that information can be gotten from the int_desc cached in the chip_data by compose_msi_msg(). Fix the multi-MSI case to use that cached information instead. Since hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc() is no longer applicable, remove it. 4.19 backport - hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc doesn't exist to be removed. int_entry replaces msi_entry for location int_desc is written to. Signed-off-by:
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Jeffrey Hugo authored
commit 08e61e86 upstream. If the allocation of multiple MSI vectors for multi-MSI fails in the core PCI framework, the framework will retry the allocation as a single MSI vector, assuming that meets the min_vecs specified by the requesting driver. Hyper-V advertises that multi-MSI is supported, but reuses the VECTOR domain to implement that for x86. The VECTOR domain does not support multi-MSI, so the alloc will always fail and fallback to a single MSI allocation. In short, Hyper-V advertises a capability it does not implement. Hyper-V can support multi-MSI because it coordinates with the hypervisor to map the MSIs in the IOMMU's interrupt remapper, which is something the VECTOR domain does not have. Therefore the fix is simple - copy what the x86 IOMMU drivers (AMD/Intel-IR) do by removing X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS after calling the VECTOR domain's pci_msi_prepare(). 4.19 backport - adds the hv_msi_prepare wrapper function. X86_IRQ_ALLOC_TYPE_PCI_MSI changed to X86_IRQ_ALLOC_TYPE_MSI (same value). Fixes: 4daace0d ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs") Signed-off-by:
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Jose Alonso authored
commit 36a15e1c upstream. The extra byte inserted by usbnet.c when (length % dev->maxpacket == 0) is causing problems to device. This patch sets FLAG_SEND_ZLP to avoid this. Tested with: 0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet Problems observed: ====================================================================== 1) Using ssh/sshfs. The remote sshd daemon can abort with the message: "message authentication code incorrect" This happens because the tcp message sent is corrupted during the USB "Bulk out". The device calculate the tcp checksum and send a valid tcp message to the remote sshd. Then the encryption detects the error and aborts. 2) NETDEV WATCHDOG: ... (ax88179_178a): transmit queue 0 timed out 3) Stop normal work without any log message. The "Bulk in" continue receiving packets normally. The host sends "Bulk out" and the device responds with -ECONNRESET. (The netusb.c code tx_complete ignore -ECONNRESET) Under normal conditions these errors take days to happen and in intense usage take hours. A test with ping gives packet loss, showing that something is wrong: ping -4 -s 462 {destination} # 462 = 512 - 42 - 8 Not all packets fail. My guess is that the device tries to find another packet starting at the extra byte and will fail or not depending on the next bytes (old buffer content). ====================================================================== Signed-off-by:
Jose Alonso <joalonsof@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Slaby authored
commit a501ab75 upstream. There is a race in pty_write(). pty_write() can be called in parallel with e.g. ioctl(TIOCSTI) or ioctl(TCXONC) which also inserts chars to the buffer. Provided, tty_flip_buffer_push() in pty_write() is called outside the lock, it can commit inconsistent tail. This can lead to out of bounds writes and other issues. See the Link below. To fix this, we have to introduce a new helper called tty_insert_flip_string_and_push_buffer(). It does both tty_insert_flip_string() and tty_flip_buffer_commit() under the port lock. It also calls queue_work(), but outside the lock. See 71a174b3 (pty: do tty_flip_buffer_push without port->lock in pty_write) for the reasons. Keep the helper internal-only (in drivers' tty.h). It is not intended to be used widely. Link: https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2022/q2/155 Fixes: 71a174b3 (pty: do tty_flip_buffer_push without port->lock in pty_write) Cc: 一只狗 <chennbnbnb@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Suggested-by:
Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220707082558.9250-2-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by:
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